








This paper is a comparison of some of the central ontological claims on the nature of prime 
matter of the Renaissance Platonist Marsilio Ficino, and the nature of space of Frane 
Petrić, the sixteenth century Platonist from the town of Cres. In it I argue that there are 
two respects in which the natural philosophies of both Platonists resemble one another, 
especially when it comes to the ontological status of the most basic substrate of the material 
world. First, both Ficino and Petrić argue for the basic existence of matter and space. Sec-
ond, both philosophers attribute an “ontological priority” to matter and space over what 












elements	 of	 Marsilio	 Ficino’s	 Platonism	 are	 discernable	 in	 Petrić’s	mature	
philosophical	 vision.2	This	 influence	 has	 been	 especially	 well-documented	
*
A	version	of	this	paper	was	presented	on	27	
September	 2007	 at	 the	 annual	 conference	
“Frane	Petrić	and	Renaissance	Philosophical	
Traditions”	in	Cres,	Croatia.	I	wish	to	thank	






Ficino	 e	 Francesco	 Patrizi	 da	 Cherso”,	 in:	
Marsilio Ficino e il ritorno di Platone,	Volu-




Firenze	 1975,	 p.	 47:	 “E	 fra	 tanto	 sentendo	
un	frate	di	S.	Fracesco	sostentar	conclusioni	








the	Nova de universis philosophia	(1591)	and	
Emendationes	 ,	 rather	 than	 the	 Discusiones 
peripateticae	 (1581).	 However,	 I	 do	 distin-






















the	forth	tome	of	the	Nova de universis philosophia,	in	addition	to	what	he	
says	about	some	of	its	central	characteristics,	resembles	Ficino’s	discussion	of	
prime	matter	in	the	Platonic Theology	in	several	salient	respects.4	Essentially,	






































space	contains	 the	 forms	of	all	 things	 in	a	 state	of	potency,	as	Ficino	held	
that	prime	matter	does	in	his	Platonic Theology.	Petrić	thought	that	the	forms	
of	all	 things	exist	 in	potency	 in	 fluori,	not	 in	 space.	Moreover,	 there	 is	no	
concept	of	mathematical	 space	 in	Ficino that	 is	comparable	 to	 the	concept	
that	Petrić	develops	in	De nova universa philosophia.	Ficino	did	not	engage	
in	mathematical	studies	and	speculations	that	are	in	anyway	comparable	to	






be	most	 evident	 below	 in	 the	 sections	 titled	
“The	 ‘Ontological	 Priority’	 of	 Matter	 and	
Space”.	
3
Charles	 B.	 Schmitt,	 “Perennial	 Philosophy	
from	Agostino	Steuco	to	Leibniz”,	The Jour-
nal of the History of Ideas	 27	 (1966),	 pp.	
505–532;	Cesare	Vasoli,	“Aristotele	e	i	‘filos-
ofi	 antiquiores’	 nelle	 ‘Discussiones	 Peripa-
teticae’	di	Francesco	Patrizi”,	Atti e memorie 
dell’Accademia Petrarca di lettere, arti e 
scienze	 44	 (1981),	 pp.	 205–233;	 M.	 Muc-
cillo,	 “Marsilio	 Ficino	 e	 Francesco	 Patrizi	
da	 Cherso”;	 Maria	 Muccillo,	 Platonismo, 
ermetismo e “prisca theologia”,	 II,	Olschki,	
Firenze	 1996;	 Thomas	 Leinkauf,	 Il neopla-
tonismo di Francesco Patrizi come presuppo-
soto della sua critica ad Aristotele,	La	nuova	
Italia,	Firenze	1990;	and	Luc	Deitz,	“Space,	
Light	and	Soul	in	Francesco	Patrizi’s	Nova de 
universis philosophia”,	 in:	Anthony	 Grafton	
(ed.),	 Natural Particulars,	 Cambridge	 Uni-
versity	 Press,	 Cambridge	 (MA)	 1995,	 pp.	
139–169,	n.	70.
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Abandoning	 the	 concept	 of	 materia prima	
grows	more	common	in	the	seventeenth	and	





concept	 that	 Ficino	 avails	 himself	 of	 in	 the	
Theologia Platonica.	In	this	way,	Patrizi	an-
ticipates	and	clears	the	way	for	modern	philo-
sophical	 criticisms.	 Ficino,	 on	 the	 contrary,	
does	not,	and	by	and	large	his	philosophical	
vision	 stands	 in	 opposition	 to	 the	 modern	
mechanistic	 worldview.	 See	 Frane	 Petrić,	
Nova de universis philosophia:	materiali per 
un’edizione emendata,	a	cura	di	Anna	Laura	




cartes,	Treatise on the World;	and	Part	I,	espe-
cially	sections	11	and	1,	in	George	Berkeley,	












Francesco	Patrizi’s	Nova de universis philos-









gument	 is	 metaphysical	 and	 is	 found	 in	 the	
Timaeus,	where	Plato	 argues	 that	 true	being	




plain	 about	 the	 condition	 of	 the	 embodied	
mind,	which	is	one	of	confusion	and	dreams.	












matter	 and	 space	 is	 helpful	 for	 elucidating	









discussion	 is	 to	establish	a	metaphysical	picture	of	 the	material	world	 that	
grounds	the	primacy	of	Platonic	ideas,	a	vitalistic	view	of	nature,	and,	finally,	






























































192–221.	Also	 see,	 James	 G.	 Snyder’s	 doc-
toral	dissertation,	“Matter	and	Method	in	the	




logy.	 He	 explains:	 “Finally,	 I	 believe	 that	




impressed	 by	 the	 arguments	 of	 Plato,	 will	

















draws	 comparisons	 about	 each.	Plotinus	de-
scribes	the	way	in	which	we	know	matter	as	
the	way	the	eye	knows	darkness.	Also	see	The 
Enneads,	 II.4.10.	 Plotinus	 writes,	 “If,	 then,	
each	thing	is	known	by	concept	and	thought,	






Harvard	 University	 Press,	 Cambridge	 (MA)	
1966.	
13
Aristotle,	 Metaphysics	 7.3,	 1028b–1029a28.	
Also	 see	 Thomas	 Aquinas,	 De principiis 
naturae.	 Here	 Aquinas	 explains	 that	 prime	
matter:	 “And	 note	 that	 although	 matter	 in	
its	 nature	 is	 neither	 formed	nor	 formless	…	
it	 never	 exists	 stripped	 of	 form	 and	 lack	 of	
form,	but	 sometimes	 takes	on	one	 form	and	
sometimes	another.	By	itself	it	can	never	exist	
for	it	has	no	form	of	its	own	and	so	–	because	




De principiis naturae,	 Timothy	 McDermott	











In	 Book	 V,	 Chapter	 IV,	 Ficino	 explains:	
“Since	things	inferior	to	God	do	not	possess	









and	 particular	 existence:	 “Therefore,	 since	
it	 is	God’s	alone	to	give	to	all	creatures	this	
common	 and	 absolute	 existence,	 but	 since	
this	existence	comes	after	nothing	and	before	
all	modes	of	existing,	then	it	will	be	the	office	
of	God	 alone	 to	bring	 something	 into	 exist-
ence	from	nothing	.	.	.”	Ibid.,	5.13.4.	
17








an	 efficient	 and	 a	 final	 cause,	 namely	 God,	
according	to	Ficino.	Ficino	explains	in	Book	
V,	Chapter	V	of	 the	Platonic Theology:	 “So	
nothing	will	be	found	other	than	God	which	
can	 properly	 be	 said	 to	 exist	 through	 itself	








































of Matter and Space
Of	course	one	cannot	ignore	the	fact	that	Frane	Petrić	rejects	the	traditional	
concept	of	materia prima,	along	with	Aristotle’s	hylomorphic	principles	of	

























ence	of	prime	matter,	Petrić	 argues	 that	 space	must	be	counted	among	 the	
things	that	exist,	and	not	those	things	that	exist	only	as	a	pure	potentially,	or	











out	 the	 Platonic Theology.	 However,	 Ficino	
will	 often	 use	 the	 word	 ‘matter’	 to	 signify	
both	 prime	 and	 corporeal	 matter,	 adding	 to	






Ibid.,	 p.	 27.	 This	 point	 seems	 to	 be	 drawn	
from	 Plotinus.	 See	 The Enneads,	 III.6.10.	
There	 Plotinus	 explains,	 “Matter,	 then,	 is	
incorporeal,	 since	 body	 is	 posterior	 and	 a	









For	 a	 discussion	 of	 Frane	 Petrić’s	 criticism	
of	Aristotle,	see	Cesare	Vasoli,	“La	critica	di	
Francesco	 Patrizi	 ai	 ‘principia’	 aristotelici”,	
Rivista di storia della filosofia	51	(1996),	pp.	
713–787.	
25
See,	for	instance,	F.	Petrić,	Nova de universis 
philosophia: materiali per un’edizione emen-
data,	pp.	22–23.	Petrić	writes:	“Si	dicatur	in	






materiis.	 Si	 duabus,	 ergo	 inter	 se	 differenti-
bus.	Differentia	omnis,	et	essentialis	et	acci-








Nova de universis philosophia	 (1591)”,	 pp.	
148–149.	In	the	Pancosmia,	Petrić	argues	in	
the	following	way:	“Are	being	and	non-being	





if	 it	 is	 not,	 then	 it	 is	 nothing.	 For	 the	 latter	
is	excluded	 from	the	class	of	beings	 (entia),	




class.	 Hence	 Space	 –	 and	 distance	 –	 which	
in	man	extends	from	head	to	fee,	belongs	to	
the	class	of	beings	and	is	something.	And	the	
same	 is	 true	 of	 any	 other	 expression	 of	 in-
terval.”	 Frane	 Petrić,	 “On	 Physical	 Space”,	
































extension,	 subsisting	per se,	 inhering	 in	nothing	else”.35	All	other	material	
things,	on	the	other	hand,	are	more	properly	understood	as	accidents	of	space,	


















considered	 themselves	part	of	 either	 the	Platonic	or	Aristotelian	 traditions.	




















position,	both	 in	 terms	of	 their	primacy	as	 first	principles,	and	 in	 terms	of	
their	lasting	and	permanent	existence.	It	is	the	forms	and	qualities	of	mate-
rial	things	that	become	more	fleeting	and	transient	on	the	ontologies	of	both	

















and	he	 introduces	elements	 that	are	wholly	 foreign	 to	Ficino’s	understand-







In	 the	 Pancosmia,	 Petrić	makes	 space	 prior	
to	 and	 more	 primary	 than	 unformed	 matter:	







about	 in	 irregular	 movements.	 Therefore	









very	 anti-Aristotelian	 line	 of	 argument.	 For	
instance,	in	the	Metaphysics,	Aristotle	argues	
that	 matter	 is	 not	 substance,	 since	 it	 is	 not	
really	 a	 determinate	 this.	Although	Petrić	 is	
speaking	about	space,	and	not	matter,	one	can	


















































o »ontološkom prioritetu« materije i prostora
Sažetak
Ovaj članak je usporedba nekih od centralnih ontoloških stavova o naravi prve materije rene-
sansnog platonista Marsilia Ficina te naravi prostora Frane Petrića, platonista 16. stoljeća iz 
grada Cresa. U njemu tvrdim da postoje dva aspekta u kojima prirodne filozofije oba platonista 
nalikuju jedna drugoj, naročito po pitanju ontološkog statusa najtemeljnijeg supstrata materi-
jalnog svijeta. Kao prvo, i Ficino i Petrić se zalažu za temeljnu egzistenciju materije i prostora. 
Kao drugo, oba filozofa pridaju »ontološki prioritet« materiji i prostoru nad onim što se smatra 











Dieser Artikel ist ein Vergleich einiger der signifikanten ontologischen Behauptungen über die 
Natur der ersten Materie des renaissancistischen Platonikers Marsilio Ficino und über das 
Gepräge des Raums Frane Petrićs, eines aus der Stadt Cres stammenden Platonikers des 16. 
Jahrhunderts. Darin vertrete ich die Ansicht, es bestünden zwei Hinsichten, in denen die na-
türlichen Philosophien beider Platoniker einander ähnelten, speziell in puncto ontologischer 
Sachlage des grundlegendsten Substrats der materiellen Welt. Zuallererst treten sowohl Ficino 
wie auch Petrić für eine fundamentale Existenz der Materie und des Raums ein. Zweitens mes-
sen die beiden Philosophen der Materie und dem Raum eine „ontologische Priorität“ zu über 





de la « priorité ontologique » de la matière et de l’espace
Résumé
Cet article est une comparaison de certaines affirmations ontologiques sur la nature de la ma-
tière première chez le platonicien de la Renaissance Marsilio Ficino et sur la nature de l’espace 
chez Frane Petrić, platonicien du XVIème siècle issu de la ville de Cres. J’y soutiens que les 
philosophies naturelles des deux platoniciens se ressemblent à deux égards, notamment en ce 
qui concerne le statut ontologique du substrat le plus fondamental du monde matériel. D’abord, 
Ficino comme Petrić soutiennent l’existence fondamentale de la matière et de l’espace. Deuxiè-
mement, les deux philosophes attribuent la « priorité ontologique » à la matière et à l’espace 










Ibid.	Also	 see,	 Plato,	 Timaeus	 49A	 ff;	 L.	 P.	
Gerson	 explains:	 “Plotinus	 frequently	 em-
ploys	the	metaphor	of	a	mirror,	the	main	point	
being	that	like	a	mirror	matter	is	unaffected	by	
that	which	is	reflected	in	it.”	Lloyd	P.	Gerson,	
Plotinus,	Routledge,	London	1994,	p.	112.	
